Numbers That Change Depending on Who Is Speaking?

Grenada’s Fiscal Narrative Is Unraveling

By Dr. Adrian Joseph, DBA

There comes a point at which economic contradictions can no longer be explained away as differences of opinion. They become evidence of a deeper failure of transparency, coordination and responsible governance.

The latest discussion on The Bubb Report exposed several disturbing inconsistencies in the Government’s economic narrative. These inconsistencies concern the projected fiscal deficit, the unemployment rate, the national debt, the depletion of government deposits and the true cost of commitments being made outside the ordinary budget cycle.

Taken together, they raise a fundamental question: Does the Government itself have a coherent and credible account of Grenada’s financial position?

Grenadians are now being told that the projected overall fiscal deficit has increased to approximately EC$534.8 million, reportedly 73 percent above the original projection of EC$309.8 million. The supplementary budget adds approximately EC$300 million to an original budget of EC$1.966 billion. Economist Dr. Patrick Antoine has estimated that the primary balance could deteriorate to approximately negative 10.8 percent of GDP. According to Dr. Antoine, on that basis and assuming the IMF’s baseline sustainability verdict holds, returning to the 1.5 percent of GDP primary surplus that the Fiscal Resilience framework requires from 2027 would demand a swing of roughly 12.3 percentage points of GDP in a single year, from the deepest primary deficit since Hurricanes Ivan (2004) and Emily (2005).

The adjustment required would be extraordinary.

It could involve higher taxes, reduced capital expenditure, restrictions on public programmes, further pressure on public-sector compensation, delayed payments to suppliers and contractors, or another round of borrowing.

The Government cannot enjoy the political benefits of spending today while refusing to explain the fiscal consequences that Grenadians may face tomorrow.

Whose Unemployment Figure Should Grenada Believe

Former Minister of Finance Mr. Anthony Boatswain reportedly assessed unemployment at approximately 5.7 percent during the discussion.

That figure demands immediate clarification.

The International Monetary Fund’s  Article IV report concluded in January of 2026 records Grenada’s unemployment rate at 10.8 percent for the second quarter of 2025. The underlying Labour Force Survey published by Grenada’s Central Statistical Office also reports an unemployment rate of 10.8 percent for that quarter.

That is almost twice the figure cited by Mr. Boatswain.

Where, therefore, did the 5.7 percent figure originate?

Was it taken from an unpublished government estimate?  Does it relate to a different quarter, age group or definition of unemployment? Was it seasonally adjusted? Does it exclude discouraged workers, particular employment categories or persons engaged in temporary programmes? Or was it simply an incorrect interpretation of another labour-market indicator? Mindful that Mr. Boatswain is not a sitting member of the Government.

These are not trivial questions.

Unemployment statistics influence fiscal policy, social programmes, education and training, private-sector investment and public understanding of the economy. A figure of 5.7 percent suggests that Grenada is approaching conditions of relatively full employment. A figure of 10.8 percent presents a markedly different picture.

Both figures cannot describe the same population, period and methodology.

If Mr. Boatswain possesses more recent or more authoritative information, he should identify the source and explain the methodology. If he does not, the figure should be corrected.

Public discourse must not be reduced to the casual presentation of statistics that make the economy appear stronger than the official evidence supports.

Growth Is Not the Same as Employment

The Administration repeatedly presents construction activity and headline economic growth as evidence of transformation. But an economy can record growth without creating sufficient sustainable employment for its citizens.

Growth driven by large infrastructure projects, imported construction materials, foreign contractors and temporary employment may increase measured output without substantially improving domestic productive capacity.

The relevant questions are not merely how much money is being spent or how many projects have been announced.

We must ask who is being employed, how many of those jobs are permanent, how much of the expenditure remains within Grenada, how much is paid to foreign contractors, how many Grenadian businesses are receiving subcontracts, what skills are being transferred to local workers and what productive assets will remain after the construction phase ends.

If unemployment remained at 10.8 percent in the second quarter of 2025 despite the scale of public expenditure and construction activity, then the Government must explain why its development model is not translating more effectively into employment.

It is not sufficient to celebrate growth while thousands of Grenadians remain outside the productive economy.

The Debt Numbers Must Be Reconciled

The national debt discussion is equally troubling.

Figures cited in public debate suggest that Grenada’s debt burden may have moved from approximately 64 percent of GDP in 2022 to more than 74 percent under a more recent ECCB assessment. The 2022 FROC Report also cites the 2022 debt at 64%. If those figures are based on the same definition and coverage, they would represent an alarming deterioration.

However, published reports contain several different debt measurements. Some figures relate only to central government debt. Others include government-guaranteed obligations, state-owned enterprises, statutory bodies, arrears and off-budget borrowing. Revisions to GDP can also materially change the debt-to-GDP ratio without changing the nominal amount owed.

The IMF’s published series, which includes state-owned enterprises and statutory bodies, does not presently establish a simple like-for-like increase from 64 percent in 2022 to more than 74 percent in 2026.

This discrepancy does not absolve the Government. It makes the case for transparency even stronger.

Which figure is the Government using? What is the present nominal stock of public debt? Does it include the obligations of state-owned enterprises and statutory bodies? Does it include Project Polaris? Does it include Design, Build and Finance commitments? Does it include unpaid certificates, supplier obligations, contractor arrears and other accounts payable? Does it include guarantees and contingent liabilities? What is the updated debt-to-GDP ratio after the EC$310.9 million supplementary appropriation and the associated financing arrangements?

The Ministry of Finance should publish a reconciliation showing every debt measure, its coverage, its source and its date. Grenadians should not be required to navigate conflicting statistics while the Government continues entering major financial commitments.

Off Budget Does Not Mean Off Liability

The IMF has already warned that state-owned enterprise investments, government on-lending and off-budget projects can create blind spots in the fiscal framework.

Project Polaris is a particularly important example. The IMF has advised that such investments should be incorporated into central government budget planning and subjected to equivalent reporting, oversight and auditing requirements.

A liability does not cease to exist because it is placed outside the ordinary budget.

Similarly, Design, Build and Finance arrangements do not provide free infrastructure. They defer payment and may add financing charges, premiums, variations and other obligations to the final cost.

The Government must disclose the principal amounts, interest charges, repayment schedules, unit rates, guarantees, maintenance obligations and total lifetime costs of these arrangements.

Without that information, no responsible analyst can determine whether the country is receiving value for money or whether future taxpayers are being committed to obligations that have not been adequately scrutinised.

Reserves Are Being Treated as Disposable Income

Some defenders of the Government argue that Grenada has accumulated substantial deposits and can therefore afford the present level of expenditure.

This argument is dangerously incomplete.

The IMF projected that government deposits could decline from 24.6 percent of GDP in 2024 to approximately 8.6 percent by the end of 2026. Those deposits were expressly identified as an important buffer against natural disasters, declines in tourism, geopolitical shocks and disruptions to CBI revenues.

Grenada is one hurricane, international recession or external financing shock away from needing those resources.

Government deposits are not political spending money. They are part of the country’s financial protection.

A Government may use reserves to respond to genuine emergencies and finance carefully assessed national priorities. But rapidly drawing down reserves while simultaneously expanding future liabilities exposes the country to greater risk.

The critical question is not whether money is presently available. It is whether the expenditure is lawful, properly prioritised, transparently procured and capable of generating sufficient economic returns.

Once the reserves are spent, they cannot be used again to protect the country.

A Deficit of This Magnitude Changes Everything

A projected overall deficit of EC$534.8 million cannot be described as a routine variation.

The scale of the deterioration changes the entire fiscal outlook.

It affects the sustainability of public investment, the credibility of the medium-term fiscal framework, the availability of financing, the Government’s capacity to respond to shocks and the burden that will fall upon taxpayers after 2026.

The IMF had previously projected a 2026 primary deficit of approximately 3.5 percent of GDP based partly on historical implementation rates and construction-sector capacity. The deficit now being discussed appears significantly more severe, almost doubling the originally assessed amount.

The Government must therefore produce an updated debt-sustainability analysis and a revised medium-term fiscal framework.

It must also explain how Grenada will move from the projected 2026 deficit to the legally required primary surplus in 2027.

Where is the adjustment plan? Which expenditure will be reduced? Which taxes will be increased or introduced? Will public servants be asked to carry the burden? Will capital projects be suspended? Will suppliers and contractors continue waiting for payment? Will more reserves be withdrawn? Will additional borrowing be required?

The public cannot be expected to accept vague assurances in place of a credible fiscal strategy.

Fiscal Expansion Before an Election

The timing of this extraordinary expenditure cannot be ignored.

When hundreds of millions of dollars are added to the national budget as an election approaches, the Government has a heightened obligation to demonstrate that every project is based on objective national priorities, proper procurement, value-for-money analysis and sustainable financing.

Public expenditure must not become an electoral instrument.

The Government must prove that these commitments were not accelerated for political advantage and that Parliament was not presented with a supplementary appropriation merely to regularise arrangements already made behind closed doors.

The country deserves to know whether contracts were signed before the required parliamentary authority was obtained, whether competitive tenders were conducted and whether the necessary fiscal and legal assessments were completed.

An award notice is not a procurement process. A supplementary appropriation is not evidence of value for money. A large bank balance is not proof of fiscal sustainability.

The Government Must Open the Books

Grenada now needs one authoritative and consolidated statement of its fiscal position.

That statement should disclose the revised overall and primary balances for 2026, the current value of government deposits, the full stock of central government debt, government-guaranteed debt, the liabilities of state-owned enterprises and statutory bodies, Project Polaris and other off-budget obligations, Design, Build and Finance commitments, outstanding supplier and contractor payments, contingent liabilities and government guarantees, the updated debt-to-GDP ratio under each recognised definition, the official unemployment rate and its methodology, and the measures required to restore compliance with the fiscal rules in 2027.

Grenadians should not have to choose between conflicting statements from politicians, former ministers, economists and international institutions.

The Government controls the official records. It must publish them.

This Is an Alarming Direction

Grenada was promised transparency, transformation and responsible government.

Instead, the country is confronting conflicting economic statistics, rapidly expanding expenditure, declining fiscal buffers, opaque financing arrangements and an increasingly difficult return to the fiscal rules.

The Government may insist that the economy is growing. But growth does not excuse poor fiscal management. It does not justify bypassing procurement safeguards. It does not make unemployment disappear. It does not eliminate debt. It does not transform deferred payments into free infrastructure.

The latest Bubb Report discussion should be treated as a national warning.

If unemployment is 5.7 percent, publish the evidence. If the debt remains sustainable, publish the complete debt reconciliation. If the contracts represent value for money, publish the tenders, unit rates and financing terms. If the reserves are sufficient, publish the drawdown projections and contingency analysis. If the country can return to the fiscal rules in 2027 without painful adjustment, publish the plan.

Until then, the Government’s economic narrative remains incomplete, internally inconsistent and increasingly difficult to believe.

Grenada cannot be governed responsibly when the numbers change depending on who is speaking.

The people deserve the facts, the full accounts and the truth.

Sources

• GrenadianLife. EC$534.8M Deficit Raises 2027 Fiscal Alarm. 21 September 2026. https://grenadianlife.com/2026/09/21/ec534-8m-deficit-raises-2027-fiscal-alarm/
• International Monetary Fund. Grenada 2025 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 26/009. January 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2026/01/20/grenada-2025-article-iv-consultation-press-release-and-staff-report-573325
• Central Statistical Office Grenada. Labour Force Survey Basic Tables, Second Quarter 2025. https://stats.gov.gd/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/2025Q2_LFS_Basic_Tables_Results.pdf
• International Monetary Fund. Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Grenada. 20 January 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/01/20/pr-26011-grenada-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation